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I. INTRODUCTION
While statutory authority exists' for counties to adopt comprehensive land
use plans2 and zoning districts,3 few counties in West Virginia have adopted land
use regulations Therefore, to the extent governmental regulation of land use exists
in West Virginia, it essentially exists within incorporated municipalities.5 The
absence of "zoning" outside of municipalities has undoubtedly contributed to the
use of restrictive covenants6 in the development of "rural" land throughout West
Virginia into residential subdivisions. In fact, in many residential developments,
restrictive covenants, in combination with home owners' associations, provide a
rudimentary form of governmental relation that "controls" the use of land within the

subdivision and affords a method of providing certain common necessities, such as
road maintenance As a general statement, since'any property owner "protected"
by a restrictive covenant has a right to enforce the covenant a basic understanding

of the law of restrictive covenants in West Virginia is important not only to
attorneys representing developers,
purchasers/homeowners.

1

W. VA. CODE § 8-24-1 to -78 (1998).

2

W. VA. CODE § 8-24-16 to -27 (1998).

3

W. VA. CODE § 8-2440 to -41 (1998).

but

also

to

those who

represent

4

As of July 1, 1997, only two counties have any comprehensive land use plans and/or zoning
outside of municipalities. Telephone Interview with David Pollard, Director of Planning for Fayette
County (July 1, 1997).
5

The enabling legislation for municipalities is the same as for county commissions. See W.

VA. CODE § 8-24-1 to -78 (1998).
6

Restrictive covenant is defined as

A provision in a deed limiting the use of the property and prohibiting certain uses.
In context of property law, term describes contract between grantor and grantee
which restricts grantee's use and occupancy of land; generally, purpose behind
restrictive covenants is to maintain or enhance value of lands adjacent to one
another by controlling nature and use of surrounding lands.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1315 (6th ed. 1990).
7

The provisions of Chapter 36B, Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act, may be
applicable to residential subdivision developments and, therefore, should be carefully considered by
developers. W. VA. CODE § 36B-1-101 to -207 (1997).
s

See generallyJubb v. Letterle, 406 S.E.2d 465 (W. Va. 1991).
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The common law rules regarding covenants were complicated and
technical. However, because most states' laws regarding covenants evolved from
the common law rules, it is helpful to have a basic understanding of them. The
common law rules of covenants begin with the rules set forth in the famous
Spencer's Case.'
II. THE EARLY COMMON LAW: REAL COVENANTS
During the early common law,"0 which spanned from 1583, or earlier, to the
mid-nineteenth century, courts only recognized what were called real covenants.
Real covenants were generally affirmative in nature and, under certain
circumstances, were recognized by the courts as running with the land. At early
common law, there were only four negative covenants permitted; these were
easements for light, for air, for support of a building laterally or subjacently
situated, and for the flow of an artificial stream." Otherwise, most real covenants
involved the covenantor agreeing to do some affirmative act involving the land,
such as building a brick wall on the land, as in Spencer's Case.2 Since real
covenants were enforceable in law, damages were the sole relief granted by the
courts for their breach; injunctive relief was not available. The technicalities of real
covenants at early common law may be best understood by examining each of the
five elements including: (1) form of the covenant; (2) whether the covenanting
parties intended the covenant to run; (3) whether the covenant touches and
concerns; (4) horizontal privity; and (5) vertical privity. 3
A.

Form of Covenant 14

In order for a covenant to have been binding between the original parties
or successors, the covenant between the original parties had to be in an acceptable
form. Because at common law the creation of covenants was deemed an interest in
land, all of the usual requirements of a conveyance of land had to be met. In

9

77 Eng. Rep. 72 (K.B. 1583).

10

See generally ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM E" AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 466 (2d ed. 1993).

11

See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 402 (1952).

12

See 77 Eng. Rep. at 73.

13

See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 10, at 469.

14

See generally id.at 469; 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 11, at 404-409.
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particular, under the English statute of frauds, the conveyance had to be in writing,
regardless of the duration of the covenant.
B.

Intent to Bind Successors 15

In order to bind future assigns, the parties must have intended for the
covenant to run with the land. Much like today, courts at early common law often
had to glean the intent of the parties from the facts of each case. The most
important determination for the courts was whether the parties intended the
covenant to benefit the land, not just to bind the covenantor to perform some
personal act. Generally, words which explicitly showed an intention to bind future
successors were not necessary. However, the law did require that any covenant
involving something not in esse had to explicitly state that it was to bind all future
assigns. For example, in Spencer's Case, the covenant required the lessee of a
certain tract of land to build a brick wall upon the land.'6 Therefore, the covenant
involved something not in esse, since the brick wall did not yet exist. The court
held that to bind successors to build the wall required that the instrument explicitly
state that the covenant was to bind the assigns of the lessee, which, in Spencer's
Case, it did so state. 7
C.

Touches and Concerns 18

The "touches and concerns" element is difficult to define but easy to
explain. The benefit and/or the burden created by a covenant must touch and
concern the land. The concept of "touches and concerns" is similar in nature to the
concept of "pornography" which Justice Stewart of the Supreme Court said was too
hard to define, but "I know it when I see it."' 9 The main goal of the requirement of
touches and concerns is that the covenant must relate somehow to the land and
should bind and benefit the land. It must be more than just a promise by one person
to do something to personally benefit another person. A modem example of "touch

15
See generally CUNNINGHAM, supra note 10, at 475-476; 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY,
supranote 11, at 415-421.
16

See 77 Eng. Rep. at 73.

17

Id. at 72.

is

See generally CUNNINGHAM, supra note 10, at 471-475; 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY,

supra note 11, at 412-415.
19

Jocobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964).
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and concern" is subdivision plans and restrictions designed to protect the value of
the properties. Even though a covenant may affect equally a lot at one end of a
development and a lot at the other end, the benefit of the covenant is for all of the
tracts equally, and the covenant is designed to protect the value of the land, not just
a means of one party to gain personally from another party.
D.

20

Horizontal Privity

The term "horizontal privity" refers to a relationship between the original
covenantor and covenantee. In order to create a covenant which had the potential
to run with the land, the transfer between the parties had to be in the form of a
conveyance (in which case, we say that the parties had horizontal privity). The
grantor need not have to convey his entire estate to the grantee in order to have
horizontal privity, but some portion of an estate had to be transferred. In other
words, adjoining landowners could not agree to bind their land for their mutual
benefit (no horizontal privity) and have the covenants bind future successors. In
addition, at early English common law, covenants could only run with the land
when the original parties were in landlord-tenant relationships.2 Even as late as
1834, in the case of Keppell v. Bailey,' the court concluded that horizontal privity
was satisfied only by a landlord-tenant relationship.'
E.

Vertical Privity

24

The term "vertical privity" refers to the relationship between the covenantor
and his or her successors. In order for a covenant to run with the land, each
successor to the original covenantor had to acquire the very same estate as his or her

20

See generally CUNNINGHAM, supra note 10, at 477-480; 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY,

supranote 11, at 409-410.
See generally JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 855-859 (3d ed. 1993);
Susan F. French, Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L.
REV.1261, 1272-1273 (1982).
21

22

39 Eng. Rep. 1042 (Ch. 1834).

23

See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 21, at 857.

24

See generally CUNNINGHAM, supra note 10, at 476-477; 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY,

supra note 11, at 410-412.
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grantor.' Horizontal privity (the conveyance between the original parties), which
was necessary in order for a covenant to run with the land, did not require the
transfer of the grantor's entire estate, but for a covenant to bind the land of
successors, the successors had to take the very same estate as their grantor36 A
popular anecdote summarizes the situation as "real covenants run along with estates
as a bird rides on a wagon."27 Thus, if a successor took less than his or her grantor's
estate, attached covenants would not have passed on to the successor.
III. EQUITABLE RESTRICTIONS:

THE BEGINNING OF MODERN COVENANT LAW
By the mid-nineteenth century, industrialization had paved the way for new
patterns of land use and occupation. Neighborhoods and communities started to
grow around industrial sites. A method to control the use of the lands became more
desirable, and real covenants, which awarded damages as the only remedy, were not
well-suited to afford such protection.2 At first, landowners turned to contract law
to try to gain enforcement of covenants that were not enforceable as real covenants.
The parties hoped that contracts would provide a way around the problem of privity
between the original parties, as well as expand the running of covenants beyond
landlord-tenant relationships. However, since contract rights and duties were not
generally assignable, theyproved worthless as a realistic means of use restrictions
for land. What was needed was some sort of property interest that could be both
enforceable against original parties without privity and assignable. In 1848, in Tulk
v. Moxhay,29 the courts of equity finally responded to the needs of the landowners
by giving birth to equitable restrictions, which were much more suited to the needs
of the times. Landowners could now, subject to more relaxed restrictions, create
covenants among themselves without any conveyances or a landlord-tenant

25

See EDWARD H. RABIN & ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN

PROPERTY LAW 485, 486 (3d ed. 1992).
26

It was the burden of the covenant that would only run with the estate of the covenantor if an

entire estate was transferred to a successor. The benefit of the covenant would pass to the covanantee's
successors by a transfer of the entire estate or some lesser estate carved out of the estate. See
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 10, at 476.
27

Id.

28

See Uriel Reichman, Toward a Unified Concept of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 1177,

1187-1188 (1982).
29

41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848).
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relationship, which would run with the land. Whereas horizontal privity had
previously been required for vertical privity, successors could now be bound even
when there was no conveyance between the covenanting parties. Neighbors,
without a transfer of land, could now bind their lands, subject to certain rules, for
their mutual benefit and security? Like real covenants, the technicalities of
equitable restrictions can be divided into the following elements: (1) form of the
covenant; (2) intent of the covenanting parties that the covenant shall run; (3) touch
and concern; (4) horizontal privity; (5) vertical privity; and (6) notice."

A.

Form 32

The same general concerns as to form that applied to real covenants, as
discussed above,33 also apply to equitable restrictions. Most importantly, equitable
restrictions, as interests in land, must be in writing to satisfy the statute of frauds.
B.

Intentfor the Covenant to Run with the Land 34

As with real covenants, courts looked at all of the evidence to determine if
the parties intended the covenant to run with the land. No particular words were
necessary to express such intent. The most important consideration for the courts
was that the parties intended to benefit the land, as opposed to binding the
covenantor to perform some personal act. Also, with equitable restrictions, the
courts did not require the use of the explicit words of intent for covenants relating
to something not in esse.

30

See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 10, at 484-486.

31

See id. at 486.

32

See generally id. at 486-488.

33

See supra note 14 and accompanying text.

34

See generally CUNNINGHAM, supra note 10, at 490-491; 2 AMERICAN

LAW OF PROPERTY,

supra note 11, at 415-421.
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5
Touches andConcerns3

Just as with real covenants, the requirement that a covenant touch and
concern the land is a concept that is not easy to define. Again, it must be more than
a "mere" personal obligation or promise. For example, it must benefit or burden
the land.
D.

HorizontalPrivity3 6

Perhaps the most important distinction between the technical elements of
real covenants and equitable restrictions involves privity. Under the law of real
covenants, in order to bind successors, a covenant had to be created by the original
parties as part of a conveyance. Under the law of equitable restrictions, covenants
could be created outside of conveyances, although, as a practical matter, most
covenants were still part of conveyances. Equitable restrictions could be created
by a contract (agreement) between two parties without being part of a conveyance
between those parties. For example, since equitable restrictions are usually
negative (they involve an agreement not to use land in certain ways), two neighbors
who each acquired their lands from a different grantor, could agree to restrict the
use of their land for the benefit of each other's land. To illustrate, suppose that A
and B own neighboring tracts of land. They decide to develop their lands into a
subdivision by dividing their properties into lots and creating a system of roads.
They decide that to make the lots in their subdivision more desirable, they will bind
their lands under a set of restrictions." Such a covenant would have lacked vertical
privity under the law of real covenants because the original parties lacked horizontal
privity, but it could be enforced in equity as an equitable restriction under the new
38
law.

35

See generally CUNNINGHAM, supra note 10, at 488-489; 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY,

supra note 11, at 412-415.
36

See generally CUNNINGHAM, supranote 10, at 491; 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra

note 11, at 409-410.
37

The agreement would need to be in writing to satisfy the statute of frauds and recorded with

the clerk of the county court in order to give record notice. See W. VA. CODE § 36-1-1 (1997) (statute
of frauds); W. VA. CODE § 40-1-9 (1997) (record notice).
38

CUNNINGHAM, supra note

10, at 491.
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Vertical Privity39

Under "real covenants," it was noted that covenants followed the estate of
a grantor and bound only successors who took the very same estate as their grantor.
In contrast, equitable restrictions do not ride with estates like a bird on a wagon, but
rather they "sink their roots into the soil." 0 In other words, equitable restrictions
bind successors who gain any possessory interest in the land, not necessarily the

exact interest as their grantor. This was important in keeping the land secure under
a covenant, since now there was less fear that the benefit of a covenant might be lost
because of an insufficient transfer to a successor.

F.

Notice 41

Because equitable restrictions are an interest in the land, in order to assure
fairness, the courts of equity required that the writing that created them had to be
properly recorded. Even though the creation of the restrictions did not need to be
in the form of a conveyance, because purchasers have record notice of all matters
appearing in their chain of title, the restriction appearing in a document within a
purchaser's chain of title gives the purchaser constructive or record notice of its
existence. However, if a covenant is not within a purchaser's chain of title, and the
purchaser does not have actual notice of the restriction and is not on inquiry notice,
then it would not be "fair" to bind the purchaser by such restrictions. 2 The court
summarized this point in Tulk, stating that "if an equity is attached to the property
by the owner, no one purchasing with notice of that equity can stand in a different
situation from the party from whom he purchases."' 3 Therefore, "equitable
restrictions are equitable interests in land that are good against subsequent
possessors who are not bona fide purchasers.""4 This was deemed an equitable
result by the courts.

39

See generally id. at 491-492; 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 11, at 410-412,

427-428.
40

CUNNINGHAM, supra note 10, at 491.

41

See generally id. at 492-94.

42

See John W. Fisher, II, The Scope of Title Examination in West Virginia: Can Reasonable

Minds Differ?, Y8 W. VA. L. REV. 449,493-500 (1996).
43

CUNNINGHAM, supra note

4

Id. at 494.

10, at 492.
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As the brief summary of the common law doctrine presented above
illustrates, this subject area of the law had evolved from Spencer's Case and is
filled with subtle "niceties." In fact, the authors of one casebook began their
introduction on the chapter, "Covenants Running with the Land (Promissory
Servitudes)," as follows:
Although the factual situations involving covenants are
usually not complicated, the law in this area is an unspeakable
quagmire. The intrepid soul who ventures into this formidable
wilderness never emerges unscarred. Some, the smarter ones,
quickly turn back to take up something easier, like astrophysics.
Others, having lost their way, plunge on and after weeks of effort
emerge not far from where they began, clearly the worse for wear.
On looking back they see the trail they thought they broke
obscured with foul smelling waters and noxious weeds. Few
willingly take up the challenge again.
When the fifty states in this country adopted the confused
English law of real covenants and equitable servitudes they added
variations of their own, although to make things interesting each
pretended that it was merely applying a well understood common
body of doctrine. In 1940 the learned scholars of the American
Law Institute undertook to restate the law of covenants and this
bred the naive hope that out of the confusion order would emerge.
The Restatement itself, however, was so controversial in its
resolution of these burning questions that Judge Clark felt impelled
to write an entire book exposing its "errors" in delightfully
intemperate language. The Restatement sections dealing with
servitudes are currently being rewritten, and one hopes that they
will meet with a kinder, gentler reception than did their
predecessors.45
Given the complexities of the common law rules and Professors Rabin and
Kwall's portrayal of the subject area as an "unspeakable quagmire," the degree of
"simplification" of the body of law in West Virginia comes as somewhat of a
surprise. While there are a few exceptions as will appear, overall the general
language and approach by the courts in West Virginia in construing restrictive
covenants/equitable servitudes has remained relatively consistent. While the
number of cases involving restrictive covenants decided by the Supreme Court of
Appeals has increased over the past three decades as compared to the first half of
45

RABIN & KWALL, supra note 25, at 447 (citations omitted).
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the century, the search for the parties' intent, aided by rules of construction, has
remained the key issue.

IV. THE EARLY WEST VIRGINIA DECISION
The law of restrictive covenants in West Virginia has its roots in Robinson
v. Edgell.46 In 1903, the plaintiff, as grantor, conveyed the lot in question to the
defendant, the grantee, with a restrictive clause which provided that "[t]his writing
prohibits the sale of intoxicating liquors in any manner whatever on the premises
hereby conveyed, and this is a part of the consideration."' 7 The fact that the parties
to the lawsuit were the grantor and grantee in the deed containing the restriction
meant that the issues of whether the covenant would run with the land and,
therefore, would be binding on remote parties was not presented. When the lower
court refused to grant an injunction enforcing the covenant, the plaintiff appealed.4"
In acknowledging the jurisdiction of a court of equity to enforce negative covenants
restricting the use of real property, the court implicitly noted that in such cases
"damages" are not a sufficient remedy.!9 In deciding whether the court should
exercise its discretion and grant an injunction, the court explained,
The right to invoke relief by injunction in such cases is not
absolute, however. To a certain extent, the jurisdiction is
discretionary. It is governed by the same general principles which
control the jurisdiction to compel specific performance of
contracts. Where a proper case for its exercise is shown, relief is
granted as a matter of course, but if, under the conditions and
circumstances obtaining, the granting of the relief sought would
work injustice or be ineffectual of any meritorious result, it will be
refused. If, therefore, the restrictive covenants in deeds, conveying
lots, were made with reference to the continuance of existing
general conditions of the property and surroundings, but in the
lapse of time there has been a change in the character and
surroundings, so as to defeat the purposes of the covenants and to

46

49 S.E. 1027 (W. Va. 1905).

47

Id.

48

Id.

"The amount of damages, and even the fact that the plaintiff has sustained any pecuniary
damages, are wholly immaterial." Id. at 1028 (citation omitted).
49
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render their enforcement an inequitable, unjust and useless burden
upon the owner of the lot, equity will refuse its aid and leave the

plaintiff to his remedy at law. When such change in conditions is
due to the act of the grantor or is assented to by him, equity will
not interfere at his instance.5
While the Robinson court did provide insight into why such covenants are
the significance of the decision, for present purposes, is the court's
acceptance of the "validity" of the covenants without discussing the common law
elements.
In Robinson, a significant portion of the eight pages of the decision dealt
used,5 1

with the defenses to enforcement raised by the defendants. 2 In rejecting the
defendants' arguments, the court granted the injunction:
Subject to the right, in the defendants and their assigns, to have the

same hereafter dissolved for any sufficient cause that may be
shown. As has been stated, the jurisdiction invoked is purely
equitable and discretionary and its exercise will extend no further
than equity, conscience and justice demand. Therefore, the
condition is put in the decree so that, in the event of such changes
50

Id. at 1028-1029 (citation omitted).

The court stated,
The most frequent illustrations of the application of the principle are
found in cases involving the rights of parties holding by conveyance town lots, as
subdivisions of a tract of land, the use of which had been limited by like or similar
clauses inserted in all the deeds for the purpose of impressing upon all the
property a certain character or quality, such as residence property. To the end that
such property may be the more readily and advantageously sold, the use of each
lot for trade, manufacturing, commercial, or business purposes is prohibited.
Although the clause is not a covenant to do a beneficial act upon the property of
the grantor, so as to directly annex to that property a benefit, but, on the contrary,
binds the grantee to abstain from the doing upon his own lot of a certain act, a
court of equity looks to the whole scheme as one intended to confer a benefit upon
the property remaining in the hands of the grantor after the sale of each lot, and
passing by subsequent conveyances to the grantees of other lots, as beneficial
interests or rights attached to their lots, and therefore enforces observance of the
provisions and restrictions as readily as a court of law would award damages for
the breach of a covenant annexed to real property in such a manner as to make it
a covenant running with the land.
Robinson, 49 W. Va. at 1028 (citations omitted).
51

The defenses to enforcement of covenants will be addressed later in this Article. See infra
note 211 and accompanying text.
52
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in the future, or such conduct on the part of the grantor and those
claiming under him, as would make the burden of the restriction
inequitable and oppressive, the coercive power of the court may be
withdrawn and the parties left to the pursuit of such legal remedies
as they may have.53
While the facts of Robinson involved party litigants who were the grantors
and grantees in the deed creating the restrictive provision, the above quote speaks
of the "defendants and their assigns" and the "grantor and those claiming under
him," that clearly suggests a covenant that runs with the land. In effect, the court
in Robinson assumed the covenant ran with the land (i.e., the court did not analyze
the "covenant" in light of the common law elements) and then decided whether the
case presented appropriate facts for a court of equity to assert its injunctive
authority. While subsequent decisions focus on the "intent" aspect of the common
law rule, these later decisions also follow Robinson in ignoring an analysis of the
touch and concern element of the common law doctrines.
The discussion in the second case involving restrictive covenants to reach
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, Withers v. Ward,54 begins with the
following statement:
That restrictive covenants, such as are involved here, are valid and
binding upon the parties, there seems to be little doubt. Robinson
v. Edgell, 57 W. Va. 157, 49 S.E. 1027; 7 R.C.L. title,
"Covenants," §§ 30, 31. They constitute limitations upon the
estate conveyed for the benefit of that retained by the grantor. And
it seems to be equally well-established that when such grantor parts
with any of [sic] the residue such covenants are for the benefit of
his grantee. In other words, such covenants run with the land. The
burden thereof attaches to the land in the hands of successive
grantees, and any advantages that accrue by reason thereof likewise
are part of the said land in the hands of the owners, so that the
owner of any one of such lots subject to such a restrictive covenant
owes a duty to the owner of every other lot laid out in the same
subdivision not to violate the restrictions; and in case he does

53

Robinson, 49 S.E. at 1030 (citations omitted).

54

104 S.E. 96 (W. Va. 1920).
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violate them, or attempts to violate them, the owner of each of the

other lots has a cause of action against him. 5
The restrictive covenant in Withers required a fifteen foot setback and that
no building erected on any said lots be used for other than dwelling or residence
purposes." The defendant in Withers violated the fifteen foot setback requirement
and was using the building as a public garage in violation of the residential use
restriction.
As was true in Robinson, the court in Withers began with the assumption
of a valid restriction.57 In its brief decision (a total of three pages) the court decided
the issuance of an injunction was appropriate."
The first decision in West Virginia that provides any significant discussion
of the historical aspects of the subject area is Cole v. Seamonds 9 The Cole case
was decided three weeks after the Withers case. The court in Cole ultimately
resolved the case by holding that while the covenants may have been binding on the

55

Id. (citations omitted).

56

Id.

57

In Withers, both plaintiff and defendant were remote grantees of a common grantor who

placed the restrictions in the initial deeds of the lots in the subdivision. Id.
58

The court stated,

It is contended, however, that while the plaintiff may have a right of
action for the violation of these covenants, it is an action at law for damages, and
not a suit in equity to enjoin their violation. We cannot agree with this
conclusion. As before stated, these covenants run with and belong to the land.
The right to have them enforced, so far as the plaintiff is concerned, is one that is
attached to his real estate. It is a part of his real estate, and when the owner of
another lot in the subdivision attempts to violate one of these restrictions he is
taking from all of the other owners part of their estate. He is not merely
committing a trespass upon it. He is destroying it, and it is very well settled that
equity will take jurisdiction by injunctive process to prevent one from inflicting
permanent injury upon the real estate of another. The authorities above cited
clearly support the jurisdiction in equity to prevent by injunction the violation of
such restrictive covenants as are involved here.
Id. at 97.
39

104 S.E. 747 (W. Va. 1920).
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original parties thereto, they were in effect personal and not enforceable against
subsequent owners of the property."
In Cole, the plaintiff was attempting to enforce a restriction in the deed
conveying 154 acres of surface out of a tract of 156 acres. As to the two acres
retained by the grantor, the deed conveying the 154 acres provided,
[T]he said parties of the first part covenant and agree to use the
said 2 acres of surface land for residence and agricultural purposes
only, and covenant and agree for themselves, their executors,
administrators, and assigns, not to conduct or suffer to be
conducted on said 2 acres of surface any mercantile business, and
that no intoxicating drinks of any character are to be sold or kept
thereon; and this covenant shall run with said 2 acres of surface
land."
It is clear from the language of the restriction that it was intended to run
with the land, and, in part, (i.e., no sale of intoxicating liquors), the restriction was
the same one enforced in the Robinson case. 2 Unless the Cole decision is viewed
in light of the fact that it involved the relationship between coal companies and their
employees in the earlier part of this century, an explanation of the decision is
difficult.
In Cole, the owners of the two acres reserved in the conveyance of the 154
acres sold one-sixth (1/6) of an acre to their daughter "without reservation,
exception or limitation of any sort, except that she should not sell and convey the

60

The court said,

The purpose thus disclosed is to prevent the presence of the mercantile
establishments, not because other forms of business are per se obnoxious, but
because of the class of people who perchance may congregate there. The motive
is unquestionably proper, though sometimes subject to abuse, and as a personal
covenant may have been binding upon the original parties thereto. But resolving
all doubts in favor of the continued free use of property, unencumbered by
restrictions, as by legal and equitable principles we must, we are of opinion that
a court of chancery should not lend its coercive power to enforce such restrictions
as equitable property rights against subsequent alienees.
Id. at 752.
61

Id at 747-48.

The court in Cole noted that "[w]e are concerned here only with such of the restrictions as
seem to prohibit the maintenance and operation of the general mercantile store and 'hot dog' wagon
sought to be enjoined in this proceeding." Id. at 751.
62
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parcel without their [her parents, the Grantors] consent."'63 The daughter, one of the
defendants, rented a building on this one-sixth acre parcel to M.A. Hindy, a codefendant, who conducted a general mercantile store; she let another building on the
parcel to Nick Gemerous, another co-defendant, who used the premises as a "'hot
dog' and soft drink establishment." The plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendants
from violating the above quoted restriction. After presenting the facts, the court
began its discusgion by noting,
It is unnecessary to enter into a discussion of the vexing
and technical rules relating to covenants running with land, for we
are of opinion that a court of equity should not exert its coercive
powers under the situation presented in this case, irrespective of
whether the provisions of the deed from Reece Browning to Cole
and Crane be considered technical covenants running with the
land, or as instances of that general class of restrictive covenants
or equitable servitudes, limiting the use of real estate, which bind
purchasers who take with notice thereof, whether they fall within
the class of such technical covenants or not. The latter question
more properly arises in an action at law to recover damages for the
violation of such agreements.
Covenants restricting the use of land are frequently
incorporated in deeds for the purpose of benefitting land retained
by the grantor, or, as in this case, land conveyed to the grantee.
Such restrictions are recognized and enforced in courts of equity,
even as against subsequent purchasers with notice, when it clearly
appears that the intention of the parties was to limit or restrict the
use of one parcel of land for the benefit of another, provided the
enforcement of such restrictions will not violate any principle of
public policy. It is wholly immaterial whether the restrictions are
technically such as "run with the land."
In the leading and pioneer case of Tulk v. Moxhay, 2
Phillips, 774, 776, this question is discussed at length:
It is said that, the covenant being one
which does not run with the land, this court
cannot enforce it; but the question is not whether
the covenant runs with the land, but whether a
party shall be permitted to use the land in a
63

Id. at 748.

64

Cole, 104 S.E. at 748.
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manner inconsistent with the contract entered into
by his vendor and with notice of which he
purchased. * * * For if an equity is attached to the
property by the owner, no one purchasing with
notice of that equity can stand in a different
situation from the party from whom he purchased.
The existence and applicability of this rule, without regard
to the question whether or not the covenant runs with the land, has
heretofore been recognized by this court in the case of Robinson v.
Edgell, 57 W.Va. 157, 49 S.E. 1027, and the general proposition
is so well settled that only a few additional authorities need be
cited.65
The court in Cole v. Seamonds also made the following comments:
It is unnecessary to discuss fully the exact nature of the
right created in equity by these restrictive covenants. By some
courts they are termed equitable easements; by others servitudes.
In some the right created is created as contractual in its nature; in
others, they are expressly recognized and protected as property
rights. This court in the recent case of Withers v. Ward, 104 S.E.
96, not yet [officially] reported, has intimated that the latter is
perhaps the real nature and characteristic of such restrictions. An
extreme application of the property theory is found in the recent
case of Riverbank Improvement Co. v. Chadwick,228 Mass. 242,
117 N.E. 244, L.R.A. 1918B, 55, which holds unconstitutional a
statute providing the procedure whereby a property owner, whose
land is subject to the burden of equitable restrictions limiting the
use or manner of using his land, may upon paying the ascertained
amount of damages which will result to the person or property
entitled to the benefit of such restrictions by reason of the
nonenforcement of the same, have the title to his property
registered free from restrictions; the court's decision being based
upon the ground that, even though payment of full compensation
is guaranteed, this is a taking of property for private purposes
without the consent of the owner, and therefore in violation of the
Declaration of Rights.
But whatever the nature of the right,when the parties by
their contract have created an equity which attaches to the
65

Id. at 748 (citation omitted) (omission in original).
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property, limiting its enjoyment in favor of another parcel, and pro
tanto enlarging the enjoyment of the latter, such equity, like all
others, will bind a purchaser, who takes the legal title with notice
thereof, at least until the surrounding circumstances and conditions
have so changed as to render nugatory, ineffectual, and inequitable
any further enforcement, thereof; Robinson v. Edgell, 57 W.Va.
157,49 S.E. 1027. Tiffany, in his work on Real Property (2d Ed.)
vol. 2, § 396, p. 1437, likens this right to demand equitable
enforcement of restrictive covenants to that by which the equitable
right to specific performance of a contract is enforced against a
subsequent holder of the property, not a bona fide purchaser for
value, as well as to the doctrine that a trust may be enforced
against a purchaser from the trustee under like circumstances.
In 2 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence (4th Ed.) § 688, the
author says:
The full meaning of this most just rule (that one
who takes with notice of an equity takes subject to
that equity) is that the purchaser of an estate or
interest, legal or equitable, even for a valuable
consideration, with notice of any existing
equitable estate, interest, claim, or right in or to
the same subject-matter, held by a third person, is
liable in equity to the same extent and in the same
manner as the person from whom he made the
purchase; his conscience is equally bound with
that of his vendor, and he acquires only what his
vendor can honestly transfer.
And again from section 689 we quote:
On the same principle, if the owner of land enters
into a covenant concerning the land, concerning
its use, subjecting it to easements or personal
servitudes, and the like, and the land is afterwards
conveyed or sold to someone who has notice of
the covenant, the grantee or purchaser will take
the premises bound by the covenant, and will be
compelled in equity either to specifically execute
it, or will be restrained from violating it; and it
makes no difference whatever, with respect to this
liability in equity, whether the covenant is or is
not one which in law 'runs with the land.'
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But it may be urged that in this case there was no transfer from
covenantor to covenantee of the land sought to be burdened with
this equity. That is true; but as said in Wiegman v. Kusel, supra, it
is not material - "that such stipulations should be binding at law,
or that there should be privity of estate between the parties in order
to warrant equitable relief. Such building restrictions will be
enforced in equity upon equitable principles, each case being
considered with reference to its own circumstances."
Moreover, it is also true that we most frequently meet
these equitable restrictions in deeds where the grantee enters into
restrictive covenants respecting the lands conveyed to him for the
benefit of adjoining land retained by his grantor. But the principle
is the same where the grantor covenants to restrict the use of land
retained by him for the benefit of land conveyed to his grantee.
Both Tiffany and Pomeroy agree upon this proposition, and the
cases cited therein support the text.66
The importance of the above quotes from Cole is that they constitute one
of the most significant jurisprudential discussions of the subject area found in any
West Virginia decision.67 However, the Cole case is most frequently quoted for the
statement "that any doubts as to the purpose, propriety, or validity of restrictions
limiting the use of property are resolved in favor of its free and unrestricted use by
the vendee."' 8 The Cole decision also recognized that the notice necessary to make
such "restrictions" binding against remote parties could be constructive as well as
actual.6 9
In the decade that followed Cole, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals decided a number of fact-specific cases by applying general rules of

66

Id. at 749-50.

The Cole case is also one of the few West Virginia cases to involve the issue of whether a
grantee is bound by the information contained in as prior, out conveyances from a common grantor.
See Fisher, supranote 42, at 509.
67

Cole, 104 S.E. at 752; see generally Deutsch v. Mortgage Sec., Co., 123 S.E. 793, 795 (W.
Va. 1024); Neekamp v. Huntington Chamber of Commerce, 129 S.E. 314, 317 (W. Va. 1925).
68

"Actual notice of such restrictive covenants is not essential. Such constructive notice as is
afforded by a duly recorded instrument in the vendee's chain of title is sufficient." Cole, 104 S.E.at
747, Syl. Pt. 4.
69
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construction. In Deutsch v. Mortgage Securities Co.,70 the court held that a
covenant which provided "that the said lot hereby conveyed shall never be used for
the purpose of constructing flats or apartments thereon... and that no dwelling
house shall be built upon the said lot except a one-family house"'" did not prevent
the lot owner from building two one-family dwelling houses on the premises. In
deciding the case, the court said that in discovering the intent of the parties,
words used are to be taken in their ordinary and popular sense,
unless they have acquired a peculiar or special meaning in the
particular relation in which they appear, or in respect to the
particular subject-matter, or unless it appears from the context that
the parties intended to use them in a different sense.72
The court further explained, "If the language of a restrictive covenant, when read
in the light which the context and surrounding circumstances throw upon it, remains
of doubtful meaning, it will be construed against rather in favor of the covenant."73
The court also applied the general rule of deed construction that if there is doubt,
the construction favorable to the grantee must be adopted.74 The court also quoted
Cole that "[r]estrictive covenants are to be strictly construed against the person
seeking to enforce them, and all doubt must be resolved in favor of natural rights
and a free use of property, and against restrictions."'7 5
A year after the Deutsch case, the court again was faced with interpreting
a residential restriction in Neekamp v. Huntington Chamber of Commerce.76 The
economic development aspects of this case are evident in the court's decision. In
Neekamp; the developer acquired 83.43 acres in Wayne and Cabell counties lying
between the Baltimore and Ohio railroad on the north and the Chesapeake and Ohio
railroad on the south. The developer began selling lots subject to a residential use

70

123 S.E. 793 (W. Va. 1924).

71

Id. at 794 (emphasis added).

72

Id. at 795.

73

Id.

74

Id.

75

Deutsch, 123 S.E. at 795.

76

129 S.E. 314 (W. Va. 1925).
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restriction in a subdivision developed on this land." When the developer became

insolvent, a special receiver sold the remaining lots without restrictions. The
Chamber of Commerce acquired lots in the subdivision for the purpose of erecting
a railroad siding from the Baltimore and Ohio tracts to a manufacturer located on
the southern portion of the tract. The manufacturer's site was served by the
Chesapeake and Ohio railway. When the plaintiff sought to enjoin the construction
of the railroad siding, the Supreme Court of Appeals applied general rules of

construction78 in holding that the 'Word"building" did not prohibit the erection of
a railroad siding.79
In 1926, in UnitedFuel Gas Co. v. Morley Oiland Gas Co.,80 the court used
the general rule of construction that "[w]ords are to be given their ordinary and

The covenants stated,
That no building nor any part thereof shall be erected or maintained
upon the premises herein conveyed nearer than twenty (20) feet to the front
property line of said lot; nor shall the dwelling erected on said premises cost less
than Fifteen Hundred Dollars ($1,500.00) when completed.
That there shall not be erected on said premises any buildings other than
for dwelling or residence purposes, or purposes of like nature, and the necessary
and proper out-buildings pertaining thereto; nor shall any building erected thereon
be used for other than dwelling or residence purposes or purposes of like nature,
and as such out-buildings pertaining thereto.
The covenants herein contained shall run with the land and the
provisions herein shall extend to the heirs and successors and assigns of the parties
hereto.
Id. at 315.
77

are not favored and will not be
"Restrictive covenants in conveyances of real estate***
aided or extended by implication." Id. at 316 (omission in original). See supra note 75 and
accompanying text.
78

The court stated,
Applying the rule of strict construction, and using the foregoing definitions
approved by the courts of all jurisdictions in this country, in construing the words
of the restrictive covenants, we are led irresistibly [sic] to the conclusion, that the
construction of the railroad spur-track of the character described in the bill of
complaint, will not constitute a violation of such covenant. This interpretation
receives convincing support from the fact that the parties made the contract under
consideration, in the light of the law of our state, that a public service corporation,
exercising the right of eminent domain, has the advantage over a private person
or corporation, in that it cannot be kept off the premises entirely, but may enter the
restricted district and destroy its exclusive character upon making just
compensation for the property rights thus taken.
Id. at 317.

79

8o

135 S.E. 399 (W. Va. 1926).
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popular meaning unless they have acquired a peculiar significance""' and decisions
in sister jurisdictions in holding that a covenant that the one acre of land was "to be
exclusively appropriated and used as a site for a schoolhouse and school for the said
township" 2 prohibited the extraction of oil and gas for commercial purposes 3 The
court in United Fuel Gas Co. "qualified" two of the rules of construction it had
relied on in an earlier case by quoting with approval a Virginia case as follows:
(1) In case of doubt as to the meaning of a deed, such
doubt must be resolved in favor of the grantee; and (2) restrictive
covenants are not favored in equity.
The application of both these rules was sought in a similar
case recently before the Supreme Court of Virginia. That court in
refusing to apply them said: "The first rule here mentioned is itself
not a favorite, and is generally said to be the one of last resort
when all other rules of construction have failed. It certainly is
never to be resorted to unless the language involved can be said to
be ambiguous. The second rule, which declares that restrictive
covenants are not favored, simply means that all doubts are to be
resolved in favor of the free alienation of real estate. Neither rule
can operate when there is no room for doubt as to the intention of
the parties." Va. Ry. Co. v. Avis, 124 Va. 711.
The statement by the Virginia court is undoubtedly the
84
law.
The only covenant case to be decided by the court in 1930s was Prindlev.
5 In this very
Baker."
brief decision (three pages), the court recognized that there are

81

Id. at 399.

82

Id.

83

Id. at 401.

Id at 399. The only other "covenant' case of the 1920s was Kaminsky v. Barr, 145 S.E. 267
(W. Va. 1928). In Kaminsky, the lower court granted injunctive relief enforcing a setback restriction.
On appeal, the injunction was modified to permit the defendant to use the "restricted area between the
building line and the avenue [for] such structure as shall not be in excess of the use made by the
plaintiff and others of the said area, and as will cause no greater interference with light, air, and outlook
than is caused by such use." Kaminski, 145 S.E. at 269.
84

85

178 S.E. 513 (W. Va. 1935).
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several different theories for enforcing restrictive covenants86 and, without aligning
itself with any of these theories, held that a covenant prohibiting the removal of
mineralsubstance 7 prevents drilling an oil and gas well.88
Several things are notable about the "covenant cases" decided in the preWorld War II era. First, there was not a large number of cases that reached the
Supreme Court of Appeals. Second, the cases were fact specific, and the court used
general rules of construction. While these decisions resolved the dispute between

the litigants, they were of limited precedential value. Third, the decisions were
generally very brief and there was essentially no analysis of the cases in light of
common law doctrine. Finally, the remedy sought in every case was injunctive
relief.

86

It is a familiar rule of equity that when deeds from a common grantor parceling

a tract of land contain a like restrictive covenant (not contravening public policy),
it may be enforced by any grantee against another grantee. Several theories are
advanced for the rule. Some courts take the view that such restrictions "are in the
nature of reciprocal negative easements." Another court holds that the restrictions
are enforceable "as a contractual stipulation which is made for their (the vendees)
common benefit." Other courts favor the presumption that:
[E]ach purchaser has paid an enhanced price for his property,
relying on the general plan, by which all the property is to be
subjected to the restricted use being carried out, and that
while he is bound by and observes the covenant, it would be
inequitable to him to allow any other owner of lands subject
to the same restriction, to violate it.
Id. at 513-14 (citations omitted).
87

The covenant stated,

That no sand pit or gravel pit shall be excavated upon said premises hereby
conveyed, and that no sand or gravel or other mineral substance shall be taken
from same for use for commercial purposes, or for any purpose, other than that of
grading of said premises, or ... to be used in connection with any building to be
erected thereon.
Id. at 513 (omission in original).
88

"Petroleum and natural gas in place are ordinarily classified as minerals." Prindle, 178 S.E.

at 514 (citation omitted).
Here, the intention of the covenant was not to prevent the removal of other mineral
substances merely because they might be of the same general character as sand and
gravel, but because their removal would lessen the desirability of the subdivision
for residential use. The removal of oil and gas would so lessen it. We are
therefore of the opinion that the term "mineral substance" as used in this covenant
was meant to include oil and gas. The covenant does not contravene public
policy.
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While the first covenant case of the 1940s"9 followed the earlier pattern, the

other cases decided in that decade are more interesting.

In Recco v. The

Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Co.,90 the court addressed the right of a railroad
company to remove a railroad crossing. The 1870 deed, which granted a right-ofway to the railroad through a 490 acre farm, provided that "the company is to build
and maintain a good crossing with cattle guards * * * ."' By 1940, a portion of the

farm had been divided into lots and was a part of the town of Hansford. The
railroad, at the urging of the State Road Commission, for "safety" reasons "closed"
the crossing upon the completion of a grade separation project (an overpass). The
plaintiff, whose business suffered because of the loss of traffic occasioned by the

closing of the crossing, sought an injunction to keep the crossing open. Whereas
the earlier West Virginia cases involved restrictive easements, i.e., restricting the
owners use of their property to residential use or the activities thereon, the Recco

case involved an affirmative covenant 2 The Recco case was before the court on
a certified question and was resolved on a procedural issue which required further
proceedings to resolve factual matters. However, in so doing the court explained
that subsequent grantees would not be prevented from enforcing the covenant
because of a lack of privity.93
Wolfe v. Landers, 20 S.E.2d 124 (W. Va. 1942) (considering the plaintiff's petition for an
injunction to enforce residential covenants).
89

90

32 S.E.2d 449 (W. Va 1944).

91

Id. at 450 (omission in original).

92

Affirmative or negative covenants are defined as follows: "The former [affirmation] are those

in which the party binds himself to the existence of a present state of facts as represented or to the
future performance of some act; while the latter [negative] are those in which the covenantor obliges
himself not to do or perform some act." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 363 (6th ed. 1990).
93

Restrictions such as covenants "not to build nearer the street than a certain line,
or not to build certain kinds of buildings, or not to use the lots for certain
purposes, or not to build so as to cut off a certain prospect * * *"(Poineroy's
Equity Jurisprudence, idem, p. 853) are not to be confused with a covenant, the
effect of which is to create in the owner of the dominant estate a vested legal
property interest in a servient estate, with the concomitant right to the owner
thereof to enjoy the same. Where an owner of land divides it into lots and sells the
lots to different grantees by deeds containing the same negative or affirmative
covenants, and the lots are sold to subsequent grantees, each will be charged with
constructive notice of the covenants in the original deed under which he claims
title. Though there would be no legal privity among the subsequent grantees and
therefore one lot owner cannot maintain an action at law against the owner of any
other lot, based upon the latter's violation of any of the covenants, a suit in equity
may be brought by an original grantee or subsequent grantee against the owner of
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Four years later, the case of Cottrell v. Nurnberger94 reached the court.
Cottrell involved both restrictive covenants and affirmative duties on the part of the
covenantor. Nurnburger, the defendant, owned 6.2 acres of land that were
subdivided to develop the Falls View addition at Lower Falls on the Coal River.
Part of the oral representations made to purchasers of lots were that "Lot No. 45 []
was reserved solely and exclusively for playground, recreational and other
community purposes for the use and benefit of the purchasers, and that he would
construct a well and a well house on that lot for their common use and benefit."'95
When the plaintiffs learned that the defendant planned to sell the lot to individuals
who planned to use the lot to construct a hotel, they sought to enjoin the defendants.
While the dispositive issue was the application of the statute of frauds, the case does
provide an extensive discussion of "easements" and "licenses" and the distinction
between the two. What the court failed to do was to include covenants within its
discussion. In Cottrell, the rights the plaintiff sought to assert included easements
(the right to go onto lot forty-five) as well as a covenant right, a restriction as to
how lot forty-five could be used, and an affirmative duty for the owner of lot fortyfive to do a certain act thereon, i.e., construct a well. Because covenants are also
considered an interest in land and therefore the statute of frauds is applicable,96 the
result of the case would be the same. The failure of the court to define and

any other lot to compel compliance with the covenants contained in the original
deeds on the theory that they created an equitable easement or servitude. But
where changed conditions will render the enforcement of the covenants
inequitable or unjustly burdensome, relief in equity will not be granted. Symons,
Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, 5th Ed., Section 1295. Unlike the instant
covenant, privity between the parties is not prerequisite to the enforcement of such
equitable easement or servitude. A court of equity will enforce such covenants,
notwithstanding there may be no legal right, because of the derelict lot owner's
inequitable conduct in the violation of the covenants. By the same token, relief
will be withheld where it would be inequitable to grant it. The Court simply
balances the equities between the contending parties, which it will not do if a
vested property right, such as is clearly shown by this record, will be destroyed
thereby.
Recco, 32 S.E.2d at 453 (omission in original).
94

47 S.E.2d 454 (W. Va 1948).

95

Id. at 455.

96

2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 11, at 339.
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articulate the distinction between a covenant and an easement as an interest in land
detracts from an otherwise helpful discussion.97
The noteworthy contribution of the 1950s to the jurisprudence of covenants
98 In Wells, the court held that when the
was State ex rel. Wells v. City of Dunbar.
state acquired property for use in a governmental capacity, the use of the acquired

property by the state in a manner which violates a restrictive covenant does not
entitle the other lot owners (i.e., those benefitted by the covenant) to compensation.
In Wells, the state acquired a lot subject to a residential. use restriction and used the

lot to construct a bridge. The issue in Wells was whether the parties benefitting
from a restrictive covenant had a property interest in the covenant, entitling the

parties to compensation for its taking. After recognizing a split of authority in other
jurisdictions, the court held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a mandamus
compelling the city to prosecute an action of eminent domain.99

The court did define the difference between an easement and license as follows: "An
easement creates an interest in land; a license does not, but is a mere permission or personal and
revocable privilege which does not give the licensee any estate in the land." Cottrell,47 S.E.2d at 456
(citations omitted).
97

98

95 S.E.2d 457 (W. Va. 1956).

99

We find ourselves in accord with the view that covenants of the nature of those
here involved should not be so construed or applied as to require the government,
or one of its agencies, in the taking or acquiring of private property for a
governmental use, to respond in damages either on the theory of a taking of a
vested right, or for breach of such a covenant. To hold otherwise would enable
those having title to real estate often to greatly inconvenience and, perhaps, defeat
the proper and orderly exercise by the government of the right of eminent domain,
guaranteed to it by the Constitution, and absolutely necessary for the operation of
the government in a manner best for the interests of all its citizens. No few
citizens should be permitted to so contract as to destroy, or make prohibitive to the
government, the right to acquire property for necessary governmental purposes.
As pointed out in the cited cases, those who enter into such covenants do so with
the knowledge that the government has the absolute right to acquire lands for
governmental purposes, and they can not be presumed to have intended an
interference with such right.
The precise question involved has not been previously determined by
this Court. Admittedly, the holding may in some cases cause injury to those
having the benefits of such covenants, but we think such injuries are damnum
absque injuria. Such damages, in most cases at least, would not be damages done
directly to the property of claimants, but would amount only to a theoretical
reduction in value. In most cases, at least, such damages would be problematical,
requiring daring speculation as to the amount thereof. Also, admittedly, there
exists a strong, well-reasoned, line of cases holding contra. The contra view is
well-stated in Meagher v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 195 Va. 138, 77
S.E.2d 461, where many authorities of that view are cited. It may be pointed out,
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"Modem covenant law" in West Virginia took shape in Wallace v. St.
Clair.' In Wallace, the plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendants from keeping
"roomers" in violation of residential use restrictions.' °' The Wallace decision
represents the most extensive discussion of covenants in West Virginia. It
summarizes many of the earlier West Virginia cases as well as cases from other
states. Whereas the earlier West Virginia cases tended to use general rules of

construction to answer fact specific cases, the Wallace decision strives to articulate
an underlying policy in construing residential restrictions. To the extent there was
language in the earlier decisions that could be construed as antagonistic to
residential covenants, the Wallace decision reflects a positive attitude by the court

toward such covenants.'02

however, that many of the cases cited consider the question as it relates to public
service corporations, as distinguished from a government or a governmental agent.
We need not here, and the holding does not, determine the question as it relates
to a public service corporation, that question not being here involved.
Iat at 461.
100

127 S.E.2d 742 (W. Va. 1962).

101

The court summarized the pivotal language of the restriction as follows:

The portion of the covenant which deals with the erection of buildings
contains the following language: "That there shall be no more than one dwelling
and that a single dwelling erected on each 60 feet frontage * * *." (Italics
supplied.) Another portion of the covenant dealing with the type of buildings
which may be erected is as follows: "That there shall not be erected on said
premises any building other than for dwelling or residencepurposes or purposes
of like nature." (Italics supplied.) A portion of the language dealing with the use
which may be made of buildings erected on the premises is as follows: " * * nor
shall any building erected thereon be used for other than dwelling or residence
purposes,or purposes of like nature * *
Id. at 753 (omissions in original).
102

Zoning regulations and building restrictions imposed by municipalities are an
accepted part of modem community life. Similar ends are frequently
accomplished in developments of residential areas, as in the present case, by the
voluntary, contractual acts of property owners by means of restrictive covenants
similar in nature to that which is herein involved. Such restrictive covenants are
not against public policy. They do not place a restraint upon alienation. Their
purpose is lawful and laudable. If the restrictions are reasonable in nature and
purpose, they are upheld. Covenants of this nature are quite unlike covenants in
restraint of trade, covenants in restraint of alienation, covenants purely personal
in nature or covenants which merely impose a restraint upon one parcel of real
estate for the benefit of another. Covenants of the type here under consideration
are designed to be for the benefit of every lot or parcel of land in the area affected
by the restriction. Each lot or parcel is not merely burdened by a restriction but
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The Wallace court held that covenants should be construed in a manner that
most closely meets the intentions of the parties. As the court explained, "the
fundamental rule in construing covenants and restrictive agreements is that the
intention of the parties governs. That intention is gathered from the entire
instrument by which the restriction is created, the surrounding circumstances and
the objects which the covenant is designed to accomplish.""1 3 Thus, Wallace
represented a new "rule" in the construction of covenants: the intent of the parties
controls.
After considering a number of cases from sister jurisdictions and secondary
authorities, the court concluded that "the defendants' use of a portion of their
dwelling as a rooming house constitutes a violation of the restriction...... The
essence of the court's reasoning is reflected in syllabus point two, which read as
follows:
Where each lot in an area developed exclusively for
residential purposes is bound by a restrictive covenant which states
that only "one dwelling and that a single dwelling" may be erected
on each lot and that the dwelling may not be used "other than for
dwelling or residence purposes, or purposes of like nature," the
word "dwelling" and the words "single dwelling" refer not only to
the type of building but also to the permissible use thereof; and the
restrictive covenant is violated by owners who keep eight roomers
for compensation in the dwelling previously erected on their lot."0 '
The last two decades have seen a marked increase, as compared to the first
half of this century, of covenant cases reaching the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals. As noted above, restrictive covenants have become common in
residential developments. As the court in Wallace observed, "under the modem

it is also clothed with the benefit which is enforceable against every other lot or
parcel. The burdens and benefits are reciprocal. The reasons for the rule of strict
construction do not obtain with full force in such a situation. "Under the modem
view, building restrictions are regarded more as a protection to the property owner
and the public rather than as a restriction on the use of property, and the old-time
doctrine of strict construction no longer applies."

Id. at 751 (citations omitted).
103

Id. at 751.

104

Id. at 755.

105

Wallace, 127 S.E.2d at 744-745.
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view, building restrictions are regarded more as a protection to the property,owner
, 6
and the public rather than as a restriction on the use of property ....
This increased usage of such covenants provides fertile grounds for
litigation, and the cases tend to fall into general categories. For example, there are
(1) cases as to whether a structure placed or planned for a parcel violates the
covenant, (2) cases involving situations in which one owner desires to use his or her
parcel for a prohibited use, and (3) cases as to whether a parcel is subject to the
restrictions. Each of these lines of cases is discussed in turn.
A.

Does the Structure Violate the Covenant?

Much of the insight in this area is courtesy of Ms. Emma Jean Allred of
Huntington. Two of the relevant decisions are the result of her attempts to prevent
a "carport" from being built on an adjoining lot, owned by the Polings, in the
Wallace Circle Subdivision in violation of a set-back restriction.0 7 While Ms.
Allred established in the trial court that the carport violated the set-back restriction,
the trial court molded the injunction to permit the Polings to build a type of carport
beyond the set-back line." 8 On appeal, the court decided the construction allowed
by the circuit decision was sufficiently substantial to be deemed a "structure" and,
therefore, a violation of the restriction. 9 The Supreme Court of Appeals remanded
with directions to the circuit court to order the removal of "that portion of the
structure which violates the set-back zone established by the covenant in their chain
of title.""' On remand, the circuit court ordered only the removal of the column
and permitted the roof and room to remain."' Ms. Allred again appealed the circuit

106

Id. at 751 (citations omitted).

107

"The building line of the several lots fronting on Wallace Circle is indicated by

__

and the main foundation of any permanent structure erected on any such lot shall not be built closer
to the street line of the [c]ircle than the building line." Allred v. City of Huntington, 304 S.E.2d 358,
359 n.1 (W. Va. 1983) (underline in original).
108

Id. at 360.

Id. at 361. "The fact that the structure rests on a column and foundation within the prohibited
" Id.
zone leads us to conclude that the circuit court erred in allowing the structure ....
109

110

Id.

III

Allred, 331 S.E.2d at 862.
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court's decision"' and again prevailed. After noting that the intent of the parties in
establishing the restriction is controlling, the court concluded,
[I]n the instant proceeding, despite the somewhat ambiguous nature
of the "main foundation of any permanent structure" prohibition,
we conclude that in light of the surrounding circumstances and the
obvious purpose to be sought, the most likely intent of the parties
as expressed in the language employed was to prohibit the roof and
room structure which the circuit court erroneously permitted to
remain. In limiting the setback prohibition to "main foundation of
any permanent structure," the initial parties to the restrictive
covenant were most likely seeking to exempt only such incidental
incursions into the prohibited area as the eaves of a permanent
structure built within the deed restriction or perhaps an awning or
similar device attached to such structure but unsupported by posts
anchored beyond the setback line. Setback lines serve to guarantee
access to light, air, and unobstructed vision. Modem construction
techniques and materials which permit permanent structure support
in manners radically different from those traditionally feasible may
not be utilized to undermine the purpose sought to be attained in
the formulation of restrictive covenants prohibiting the
construction of main foundations beyond a prescribed setback
3
line."
Again the case was "remanded with directions that the circuit court order that the
Polings remove that portion of the roof and room which violated the setback zone
established by the restrictive covenants in their chain of title.""' 4
Finally, because it is not uncommon for residential sub-divisions in West
Virginia to have restrictions prohibiting "mobile homes," the case of Billings v.
Shrewsbury,"5 is a decision worth noting. In Billings, the issue involved a
restriction against the placing of a mobile home in a residential subdivision." 6
112

Id. at 862.

113

Id. at 863.

"4

Id.

115

294 S.E.2d 267 (W. Va. 1982).

116

The covenant provided that "[n]o building of temporary nature, nor trailer, nor mobile home,

nor tent, except a child's tent, shall be erected or placed on the property .... "Id. at 269.
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Because the facts of the case involved two structures - one a prefabricated sectional
and the other a structure consisting of "two separately towable units that were
designed to be joined into one unit," i.e., a double wide117 - the case provides
considerable guidance as to what constitutes a "mobile home." The court held the
"prefab" was not a mobile home,"' but the "double wide" was a "mobile home.' " 9

117

Id. at 270.

The Shrewsbury home was clearly not designed to undergo repeated moves. A
manufacturer's representative testified in the lower court that the R-Anell sectional
home must be moored to a permanent foundation just like a conventional stickbuilt home because of its substantial weight Failure to support the home with this
foundation invalidates the warranty. Further testimony indicated that once the
sectional home is tied into the required foundation, it can be moved only as a
stick-built home, an effort that costs some $4,000.
Further evidence that the Shrewsbury home is not designed for repeated
moves is demonstrated by the way in which it is constructed. The center cap
shingles, ventilation and heating systems and portions of the siding were not
added until the major prefabricated sectional components had been joined
together. Furthermore, the Shrewsbury residence is constructed very much like
a conventional stick-built home. Its walls are built of two-by-fours set on 16-inch
centers. The roof trusses are built with two-by-twos which are also set on 16-inch
centers[,] and the outside walls are covered with lap siding. We also note that the
Shrewsbury home is aesthetically acceptable. Photographs admitted into evidence
show that this home had the appearance of a conventional, single-family dwelling
and compared favorably to other homes in the subdivision.
Id. at 269.
118

The Trigg home, on the other hand, falls within the legislative definition of a
mobile home. Like the Shrewsbury house, this structure originally consisted of
two separately towable units that were designed to be joined into one unit. The
difference, however, is that this structure was designed to be separated again for
repeated moves. Testimony given below indicates that the two Trigg units are
designed to be unbolted from one another so that they can be moved separately.
Further testimony indicates that this structure, commonly known as a "double
wide" trailer, was designed so that it need not rest upon a permanent foundation
and can be adequately supported by blocks set on any solid surface.
The Trigg unit, however, rests upon a permanent foundation and several
witnesses testified that it can be moved only in one piece as a stick-built home.
The Triggs contend that this improvement renders the structure immobile and
prevents it from being within the definition of a mobile home. We disagree.
Mooring this structure to a cement block foundation does not change the essential
nature of its construction.
Id. at 270.
119
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Where the Structure Complies But the Use Does Not

2 ' three acres out of
In Allemong v. Frendzel,"
a tract of 256 acres were
conveyed subject to a restrictive covenant. The restrictive covenant provided that
"[this conveyance is subject to the restriction that no alcoholic beverages of any
kind shall be sold on said premises, and this covenant shall run with the land."'2
Successors in interest to the 253 acres sought to enjoin the owners of a parcel of
1.06 acres, which was a part of the three acres subject to the restriction, from
22
violating the covenant by selling alcoholic beverages at their convenience store.
The court considered the threshold question as one of standing, i.e., did the
successors in interest of the 253 acre tract have standing to seek an injunction to
enforce the restrictive covenant imposed on the three acre parcel "carved" out of the
home place?" While an analysis of this issue from the common law perceptive
would have included the issue of privity, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals stated that "the right to enforce a restrictive covenant depends directly
upon an intent to benefit the land of the person seeking to enforce the restriction,"
and "the intention as to whom is entitled to the benefit of or who may enforce a
restrictive covenant is ultimately a question of fact."' 24 The court recognized the
case-specific nature of this inquiry, stating that "individual cases are useful as
precedent chiefly for the general principles that they recognize and declare."'" The
court answered the standing issue by stating, "[t]he record supports a conclusion
that the intent of L.B. Allemong [the grantor who imposed the restriction] in placing
the restrictive covenant in the conveyance of that portion of his property was to
protect and preserve the quality of the neighborhood."' 2 6 The court also said that
Vincent and Mary Howard had standing to seek enforcement of the covenant as
well because "as adjacent landowners to the restricted parcel, their land was

120

363 S.E.2d 487 (W. Va. 1987).

121

Id. at 489.

122

Id.

123

Id. at 490.

124

Id.

W.

Allemong, 363 S.E.2d at 490.

126

Id.
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intended to reap the benefit of the restrictive covenant."' 12 7 Because the only
description of the Howards' is as "adjacent landowners," it appears that they were
not in either "horizontal" or "vertical" privity, i.e., successors in interest. This
abandonment of any type of privity requirement marked a significant departure from
the common law rules.
After questioning the general rules of construction developed by the court
in covenant cases from the first half of the century, the court noted, "[t]he
fundamental rule in construing covenants and restrictive agreements is that the
intention of the parties governs. That intention is gathered from the entire
instrument by which the restriction is created, the surrounding circumstances and
the objects which the covenant is designed to accomplish."'" The court concluded
that the restriction was not ambiguous nor obscured by the passage of time,'29 and,
therefore, the prohibition against the sale of "alcoholic beverages" encompassed
beer sold in the defendants' convenience store. 3 ° In granting the injunction, the
court rejected the defendants' arguments that the changes in the neighborhood
effectively destroyed the objectives of the covenant, rendering it unenforceable."3
A common type of "use" case involves an attempt by a parcel owner to use
his or her residence for a business purpose. The case of Miller v. Bolyard'32
illustrates this problem. In Miller, the restrictions were designed to assure a
residential subdivision.' The dispute began when the Bolyards started operating

127

Id. at 491.

128

Id

129

Id.

130

Allemong, 363 S.E.2d at 492.

13

Id.

132

411 S.E.2d 684 (W. Va. 1991).

133

Id. at 685. The relevant restrictions provided:
3. That the structure erected on said lots shall be used for residence purposes only
exclusive of any other use whatsoever[;] ...
7. That the lot shall be used for construction of only one dwelling; the nature of

which construction is limited to a single family residence;
8. That the dwelling erected on said lot shall not exceed two (2) stories in height,
nor shall the same be provided with a private garage which exceeds two (2)
automobiles in capacity;...
10. That any garage or outbuilding permitted by these restrictions, whether or not
attached to the principal dwelling, shall be of the same design and material as the
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a beauty shop in their house and built a large garage (twenty-four feet wide, forty
feet long and eighteen feet high) 185 feet from their house, but only twenty-seven
feet from one of the plaintiffs' houses.'3 4 The court found that the garage, which
was built on a separate lot from the one the house occupied, violated the restriction
on the size of garages. 3 ' The court rejected the defendants' arguments that the
plaintiffs' failure to object to another large garage located 150 yards from their
house constituted a "waiver" of their right to object to the defendants' garage.' 36
The court also found the operation of the beauty shop violated the covenant
restricting the subdivision to "residential purpose."'37 Finally, the court rejected
arguments that a radical change in the neighborhood essentially destroyed the
objects and purpose of the covenants in this case' and that the plaintiffs did not
have "clean hands" because of car restoration work they performed in their
basement garage. 3 9
C.

Do the RestrictionsApply to the Parcelin Question?

Given the ramifications of a parcel being subject to restrictive covenants,
the question of which parcels of land are "covered" is obviously important. The
first case to present this issue to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was
Jubb v. Letterle.40 In Jubb, the defendants planned to develop Mountainaire
Village on approximately forty-two acres of land in Mineral County. 4 ' In pursuit
of the goal, they had engineering drawings prepared on February 14, 1982, which
depicted roads, water lines, lots and a layout to encompass Mountainaire Village.
On October 19, 1982, they placed restrictive covenants on record in the county

principal dwelling....
Id.
134

Id. at 686.

135

See supra note 133, at Restriction No. 8.

136

Miller, 411 S.E.2d at'687.

137

See supranote 133, at Restriction No. 3; see also Miller, 411 S.E2d at 687.

138

Id.

139

Id.

140

406 S.E.2d 465 (W. Va. 1991) (Jubb1).

141

See id. at 467.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol100/iss1/8

34

Fisher: The Evolution of Restrictive Covenants in West Virginia

19971

EVOLUTION OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS IN WEST VIRGINIA

clerk's office, which "indicated that the restrictive covenants would be applicable
to Mountainaire Village and referenced the plat map of February 14, 1982, by Stultz
[the surveyor] as the scope and character of Mountainaire Village.' 4' The plat map
was not recorded. 4 1 The defendants contended that prior to the sale of any lots, the
scope of Mountainaire Village was scaled down considerably from the original
plan.' 4 Of the eleven lots sold, deeds for six of the lots made reference to the
restrictions and the deeds for five of the lots did not. 45 When the plaintiffs learned
that the defendants were advertising the lots for sale without restrictions, they
sought to enforce the application of the restrictive covenants to the entire
subdivision as it appeared on the February 14, 1982 plat map. 46 Even though the
plat map of February 14, 1982, was not recorded, the court explained,
The act of placing the restrictive covenants on file evidenced a
common scheme to enforce the restrictive covenants upon the lot
owners. The restrictive covenants referred to the February 14,
1982, Stultz drawing, and such drawing was produced during
discovery. The existence of the restrictive covenants was easily
ascertainable by any individual conducting a title search in
preparation to purchase a lot in Mountainaire Village.
Furthermore, the restrictive covenants remained on file throughout
the appellants' purchases and were consequently specifically
binding upon the owners whose deeds referenced those restrictions.
Thus, whether through actual or constructive notice, any potential
purchaser would have been aware of the restrictive covenants.' 47
In holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to injunctive relief, the court
stated,
[W]e conclude that it was the intention of the appellees, upon
placing the restrictive covenants on file, to create a general plan or

142

Id.

143

Id.

144

Id.

145

Jubb I, 406 S.E.2d at 468.

146

Id.

147

Id. at 469.
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common scheme of development restricting the usage of all lots
within the subdivision for the mutual benefit of all owners. We
further hold that each individual owner purchasing property within
the area originally designated Mountainaire Village, as depicted in

the February 14, 1982, Stultz drawing, acquired a right to enforce
1 48
the restrictive covenants against any other owner or owners.

The litigants in Jubb were back before the Supreme Court of Appeals just
three years after the decision in the first case.'4 9 Following the decision in Jubb I,
the defendants sold six-tenths of an acre in the northeast comer of the forty-two acre
tract to an individual who built a chiropractic office on it. 5 The six-tenths acre
tract was separated from the balance of the forty-two acre tract by two tracts owned
by a third person and was never owned by the defendants, i.e., were not sold by the
defendants out of the forty-two acre tract.' The determinative issue was whether
the common scheme of development included the entire forty-two acres or just that
portion of the forty-two acres designated as Mountainaire Village on the Stultz
drawing of February 17, 1982.52 The court held that because the Stultz plat of the
area depicted as Mountainaire Village did not include the six-tenths acre tract, the
restrictions were not applicable to that parcel.'

148

Id.

149

Jubb v. Letterle, 446 S.E.2d 182 (W. Va. 1994) (Jubb11).

15o

Id. at 184.

151

Id.

152

Id. The court noted that the correct date of the Stultz drawing was February 17, 1982, and

not February 14, 1982, as stated in Jubb 1, 406 S.E.2d 465. Jubb 11, 466 S.E.2d at 184 n.2.
153

Jubb 11, 446 S.E.2d at 185.
The February 17, 1982, Stultz drawing, which depicts the area to be known as
Mountainaire Village and which designates areas for future development of that
subdivision, does not include the property purchased by Mr. Bohn. The Bohn
property is separated a good distance from the appellants' property by sloping
terrain and is not visible from the appellants' property. It is evident that by
"redrawing" the property lines, the circuit court more precisely determined which
land is and is not subject to the restrictive covenants. In so doing, the circuit court
attempted to reach a common-sense decision which does not conflict with our
decision in Jubb I and which may preclude future litigation regarding the
applicability of the restrictive covenants. We agree with the circuit court's
conclusion that the restrictive covenants placed on file in the Mineral County
Clerk's office apply to the area depicted in the February 17, 1982[,] Stultz
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The issue of whether a specific parcel is within the subdivision was again
before the court in Teays Farms OwnersAss'n, Inc. v. Cottrill.'5 4 The developer
had acquired a 385 acre tract, which he planned to develop in phases. 5' The parcel
in question contained four acres on which was located a stable and riding ring." 6
Those four acres had never been depicted upon any plats or maps to which the
restrictive covenants were made applicable." 7 The defendant acquired title to the
four acres pursuant to a foreclosure of a deed of trust. The suit ensued when the
owners association sought to enjoin the defendant from expanding the stable
facilities and from constructing an indoor riding area, an obvious business
enterprise.'
The court explained the problem it faced in resolving the dispute as follows:
This matter is presently before this Court due to an
unfortunate occurrence; the developers of this 3 85 acre tract failed
to explicitly identify the raisond'etre of the property on which the
stable and riding ring were located or concisely define the
relationship between that four-acre tract and the subdivision. The
developers failed to provide any definite indication of whether this
four-acre tract in question was to be considered a part of the
subdivision subject to the restrictive covenants, a part of the
subdivision not subject to the restrictive covenants, or simply a
recreational area adjacent to the subdivision. This absence of any
clear characterization of the property created a situation in which
the four-acre tract, if considered within the subdivision, has
technically been in violation of the subdivision's restrictive
covenants since the origin of both the stable and the subdivision.
Now, several years later, we are placed in the unenviable position

drawing as Mountainaire Village, which does not include the Bohn property.

Id.
154

425 S.E.2d 231 (W. Va. 1992).

155

Id. at 232.

156

Id. at 233.

157

Id

158

Id. "The restrictive covenants that prohibited buildings other than single dwellings, [sic]

stated all properties should be used only for residential purposesj- and prohibited owners from
conducting any business, profession, or trade on the properties." Teays Farm, 425 S.E.2d. at 233 n.1.
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of characterizing the property in question and its relationship to the
subdivision." 9
The court further explained that "[w]hen all tangible indicia of the legal status of
property and the application of restrictive covenants fail to provide a resolution,
attention must be shifted to the original intention of the parties."' 60
In this case, the developer was available to testify regarding the original
concept of the subdivision and stated that the four-acre parcel was not subject to the
restrictive covenants applicable to the lots sold for residential purposes.' 6' After
expressing an appreciation for the concerns of the homeowners, the court sought a
Solomonic solution:
We conclude that the owners association is certainly entitled to
reasonable assurance that the property in question will not be
converted into some intolerable business activity. Yet the
Appellants must also be provided with the opportunity to use their
property in an appropriate manner. As explained above, the final
analysis convinces us that while no filed document specifically
includes this four-acre tract as subject to the restrictive covenants,
this property must, as a practical matter, be considered as part of
the Teays Farms subdivision. Consequently, we believe that while
the restrictive covenants are not enforceable against this property,
its status as part of the subdivision prevents unrestricted usage by
the Appellants. The Appellants must be limited to the use to which
the property had already been placed, specifically a stable area and
riding ring. With regard to any additions to the stable as
contemplated by the Appellants, we conclude that such additions
must be built, operated, and maintained in such a manner as not to
constitute a nuisance in a pleasant residential community. 62
One may explain the court's decree in Teays Farms as a court exercising
its equity powers in resolving the dispute between the litigants. However, a closer
reading of the case reveals that the court actually followed its earlier decisions,

'59

Id.at 234.

160

Id.

161

Id.

162

Id. at 234-35.
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which stressed the original intent of the parties in holding the four-acre parcel was
not subject to the restrictive covenants.163 The court also provided admonition

limiting "unrestricted usage" as dictum designed to send a strong message to the

parties as to what the court might consider to be a nuisance)"
Two years after the Teays Farms case, the court decided Armstrong v.
Stribling.6 Armstrong resembledJubb in both facts and outcome. Again, the issue
was whether certain parcels were part of a development and, therefore, subject to
restrictions applicable to lots in the subdivision or whether they were outside the

development and, therefore, not subject to the restrictions."6 This case involved Hy
View Terrace Subdivision in Wood County developed by the Coffinans in the
1970s. 67 Two plats depicting Hy View Terrace were prepared and filed with the
Wood County Planning Commission. 68 One plat contained forty-five lots and the
other plat eleven lots.'69 A third plat which contained forty-five lots, including a
recreation area and indications of future development, was also prepared but was
not filed with the Planning Commission."O Only the plat which contained the
eleven lots was approved and recorded in the office of the clerk of the County

163

.

..

"[W]e believe that ...

the restrictive covenants are not enforceable against this property

." Teays Farm, 425 S.E.2d. at 235.

164
Credence to this explanation is found not only in the language of the court quoted above, but
also in the accompanying footnote which reads,
Unrestricted use would obviously also be prohibited by prevailing nuisance law.
See generally Hendricks v. Stalnaker, 181 W.Va. 31, 380 S.E.2d 198 (1989)
regarding what constitutes a nuisance. See also Kahlbaughv. A-] Auto Parts, 182
W.Va. 692, 391 S.E.2d 382 (1990) regarding the determination of what
constitutes a residential area from which offensive business activity may be
excluded. Kahlbaugh explains that whether the business will be permitted
depends upon the surrounding facts and circumstances of each particular case,
considering such factors as the type of locality, the tradition of business activity,
and the particular acts complained of. 182 W.Va. at 694, 391 S.E.2d at 384.
Id.at 235 n.2.
165

452 S.E.2d 83 (W. Va. 1994).

166

Id. at 86.

167

Id. at 85.

168

Id.

169

Id.

170

Armstrong, 452 S.E.2d. at 85.
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Commission of Wood County. 7 ' Recorded with the plat for eleven lots were
restrictive covenants. 2 The Coffinans "began conveying lots in and around the
area depicted as Hy View Terrace."'7 In 1977, the Coffinans conveyed their
remaining interest in Hy View Terrace to the Crooks, and the deed of conveyance
stated,
This conveyance is made subject to those certain restrictive
covenants and conditions more particularly set forth on the Plat of
Hy View Terrace Subdivision recorded in said Clerk's Office in
Plat Book No. 15 at page 47, and to all easements, rights of way
and reservations that now appear of record affecting said
premises. 74
When the Crooks defaulted on their loan, the defendants acquired
75
approximately 322 acres of the original forty-five acres at the foreclosure sale.
The deed conveying the land to the defendants "explicitly states that the appellants'
property was to be subject to the restrictive covenants filed with the eleven-lot plat
recorded in the Wood County clerk's office.' 76 After acquiring title, the
defendants obtained a "surrender and release" of all rights and reservations held by
the Coffmans and the bank as the former deedholders of the land; they then filed
suit to cancel and terminate the restrictive covenants as a cloud on their title.'" The
defendants planned to build a four-unit apartment, which would have been in
78
violation of the restrictive covenant.

171

Id.

172

Id.

Restrictive covenant number two provides: "Lots shown shall be used for residential

purposes only[] and only one dwelling shall be erected on any lot. No lot can be further subdivided."
Id. at n.3.
173

Id. at 85.

174

Armstrong, 452 S.E.2d at 85.

175

Id.

176

Id.

177

Id. at 85-86.

178
Id. at 85. The property owners (defendants herein) prevailed in the cloud in title case, but
the landowners (plaintiffs herein) in Hy View Terrace were neither served nor given notice of the
hearing on the action to remove the restrictions as a cloud in title. Armstrong, 452 S.E.2d at 86.
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The issue, therefore, was whether the restrictive covenant applied to all of
the Coffmans' property, all three plats, or to just the eleven lots on the plat recorded
with the restrictions. The court noted that the test was the original intent of the
parties. 179 The court held that "it is clear from the facts in this case that the
developers of the subdivision, Mr. and Mrs. Coffinan, intended that the restrictive
covenants apply to the appellants' property. '180

In discussing the intent of the parties, the court found persuasive the fact
that the "Coffnans conveyed several lots other than the eleven depicted in the
recorded plat which also specifically refer to the restrictive covenants that apply to
'
Hy View Terrace."181
In addition, the court found it "significant that access to Hy
View Terrace can only be achieved by use of one road, which is privately
maintained by the homeowners' association of Hy View Terrace,"'8 and the access
to the defendants' property is via this road." Finally, the court noted that the deeds
84

to thirty homes in Hy View Terrace all referred to the restrictive covenants.

Jubb and its progeny show a clear commitment by the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals for placing the intent of the parties above all other
considerations when construing restrictive covenants. Moreover, if the intent of the

179

Id. at 87.

Id. It is noted that in a motion for a new trial the defendants submitted an affidavit of
developer Peggy Coffman which stated,
At no time during the period which they owned said tracts of land did they intend,
plan or represent to anyone that any part of said land, other than the lands
contained within [the recorded eleven-lot plat] were to be encompassed or
contained within Hy-View Terrace or subject to the restrictive covenants adopted
by Coffinan for Hy-View Terrace Addition.
18O

Mrs. Coffnan further stated that she had never before seen the forty-five lot plat
which Mr. Mills testified was used to induce him into purchasing land in Hy-View
Terrace. Mrs. Coffman acknowledged that the deed conveyed to the Crooks, a
predecessor in the appellants' chain of title, did state that the conveyance was
subject to the restrictive covenants contained in the recorded eleven-lot plat, but
explained that the inclusion of that provision in the deed was "an error on the part
of the scrivener of said deed" and that she did not intend for the deed to contain
any such provision.
Id. at 86.
181

Armstrong,452 S.E.2d at 87.

182

Id.

183

Id.

184

Id.
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parties is clearly expressed in the covenant, the court will most likely favor an
interpretation of the covenant that is consistent with this clear expression.
V. MISCELLANEOUS DECISIONS

As illustrated by G. Corp., Inc. v. MackJo, Inc.,' 85 restrictive covenants are
not limited to residential situations. In G. Corp., the court resolved the issue by
finding the parties' intent from within the four comers of the Declaration of
Protective Covenants."8 6 MackJo, the defendant, was the owner and developer of
a light industrial park. 7 MackJo conveyed 11.28 acres within this industrial park
to G. Corp. and also granted to G. Corp. "a non-exclusive 40 foot easement or rightof-way leading from Corridor G to the 11.28 acres."'8 Section 6.01 of Article VI
in the declaration was entitled "Covenants and Restrictions" and provided "[t]he
following covenants, restrictions, limitations, regulations and agreements are hereby
imposed on lots in Childress Place[:] ...[n]o part of the Industrial Park shall be
used for residential purposes."' 89 Subsequent to the conveyance to G. Corp.,
MackJo conveyed a "non-exclusive right-of-way and easement forty feet in width"
to Herman Fletcher, the owner of an adjoining tract of land.' Mr. Fletcher planned
to develop a residential subdivision on the adjoining tract of land that would be
served by the non-exclusive easement. 9' The plaintiff sought to enjoin the use of
the right-of-way to the Fletcher property as a violation of the "no residential
purposes" restriction. 92 In rejecting the plaintiff's argument, the court noted the
restriction that "no part of the Industrial Park shall be used for residential purposes"
was part of Article VI of the declaration "which is prefaced by the admonishment
that . . . [t]he following covenants, restrictions, limitations, regulations and

185

466 S.E.2d 820 (W. Va. 1995).

186

See id.at 825.

187

Id. at 822.

188

Id.

189

Id. (emphasis added).

190

G. Corp., 466 S.E.2d at 822.

191

Id. at 823.

192

Id.
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agreements are hereby imposed on lots in Childress Place ... ."'9 The provision
concerning the use of the non-exclusive right-of-way was in Article IV.' 4 In
addition, Article VII provided that MackJo contemplated developing "tracts
adjacent and neighboring to Childress Place, and, most likely, [would] utilize the
entrance, roads and streets of Childress Place in such development and use
thereof."195 G. Corp. is again another example of the court's commitment to
construing covenants consistent with the parties intent. The lesson from G. Corp.
is that the court will use the parties intent as the sole factor when construing
covenants. As a result, careful articulation of the parties intent in the covenant is
clearly the prudent practice.
One of the more interesting decisions is McIntyre v. Zara,'96 a per curiam
decision that reversed the lower court's granting of a motion for summary
judgment." 7 Mrs. Zara conveyed approximately 1.497 acres out of a 29.87 acre
"At the time of the sale, no restrictions,
tract to Mr. and Mrs. McIntyre.'
protective covenants or reservations for the land were recorded."' 99 However, the
deed conveying the property to the McIntyres provided,
By acceptance of this deed, the Grantees specifically agree and
consent to conform to any and all future declarations of
restrictions, protective covenants and reservations pertaining to a
sub-division which may be developed from real estate presently
belonging to the Grantor, and which is adjacent to the property
herein conveyed. The Grantees and their successors, shall have all
rights and privileges of membership in the future Property Owner's
Association for such sub-division, and shall comply with all
restrictions, covenants, and reservations pertaining to such sub-

193

Id at 825.

194

Id.

195

G. Corp., 466 S.E.2d at 825.

196

394 S.E.2d 897 (W.Va. 1990).

197

Id. at 898.

198

Id.

199

Id.
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division and pertaining to membership in such future Property
Owner's Association.2 0
Ten months after the conveyance to the McIntyres, a declaration of various
restrictions, covenants and reservations pertaining to the proposed subdivision was
recorded. 20 ' The McIntyres found the restrictions contained in paragraphs "M" and
"P" of the declaration, which stated that all home construction, excavation,
additions, and/or remodeling within the boundaries of Skyline Estates Subdivision
would be performed by Skyline Contracting at a fair market rate unless
objectionable. Paragraph "M" of the declaration provided, "[N]o numbered lot may
be subdivided without the written consent of the Declarant or the 'Building Control
Committee.""'2 2 Paragraph "P" provided, "[A]II home construction, excavation,
additions, and/or remodeling within the boundaries of Skyline Estates Subdivision
will be performed by Skyline Contracting at a fair market rate unless approval is
granted in3writing by Skyline Contracting to allow others to perform a specific
20
project.
After holding that the restrictive covenant in this case was sufficient to
comply with the statute of frauds,204 the court summarized the law in this state that
evolved in the earlier case construing covenants and reaffirmed that the court should
seek the parties' intention.2 '
As noted above, the McIntyres objected to the restrictions that prohibited
the subdividing of lots and the "requirement" to use a certain builder. If the
200

Id. at n.1.

201

McIntyre, 394 S.E.2d at 899. See generally2 AMERICAN

LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 11,

at 415 (entitled "Land Which Parties Intend to be Benefitted").
202

McIntyre, 394 S.E.2d at 899 n.2.

203

Id.

204

Id. at 899.
In the present case, although the declaration was recorded after the McIntyres'
deed, the deed not only refers to the future covenants but specifically notes that
the McIntyres agreed to conform "to any and all future declarations of restrictions,
protective covenants and reservations pertaining to a sub-division which may be
developed." The reference to the restrictive covenants in the McIntyres' deed is
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of W. Va. Code § 36-1-1 [1931].

Id.
See McIntyre, 394 S.E.2d at 900. "On remand the circuit court should allow the parties to
present evidence concerning their intentions and the alleged agreement regarding the restrictive
covenants." Id.
205
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McIntyres found the restrictions imposed after their purchase objectionable, the
court said they should be granted rescission. The court explained,
If the circuit court determines that the parties' intentions with
regard to the restrictive covenants are so material that it affects the
substance of the contract, the circuit court should order rescission,
an extraordinary remedy. See Morrisonv. Waggy, 43 W. VA. 405,
27 S.E. 314 (1897); FearonLumber and Veneer Co. v. Wilson, 51
W. VA. 30, 41 S.E. 137 (1902) (rescission appropriate remedy
when substance of the contract affected); Boyd v. PancakeRealty
Co., 131 W. VA. 150,46 S.E.2d 633 (1948) (upholding rescission
based on a mutual mistake concerning an easement). If the circuit
court orders rescission, it should return the parties as closely as
possible to their pre-contract positions by rescinding the deed,
returning the purchase price, awarding interest on the purchase
price and awarding costs plus interest for any improvements made
to the land.20 6
The possibility that a party can be bound by restrictions placed upon land
subsequent to his or her acquiring title thereto presents troubling aspects.
Presumably, "notice," which was recognized as early as Cole v. Seamonds, 20 7 must
be present before a party will be bound. Although the court in McIntyre did not
discuss notice, the fact that the grantee accepted the deed, which contained the
agreement to subject the parcel conveyed to the future declaration, amounts to
actual notice.0 8 The court assumes that allowing recession if "the restrictive
covenants are so material that it affects the substance of the contract" 2 9 provides
adequate protection to the purchaser. However, since it seems probable that the
resolution of that issue would frequently require litigation, it is suggested that even
if one assumes that the McIntyre case is limited to its facts as a practical matter, an
attorney should be very reluctant to advise a client to enter into a transaction which
binds them to future restrictions.

206

Id. "The Mclntyres' brief indicates that construction of a house was started on the land."

Id. at n.3.
207

104 S.E. 747 (W. Va. 1920).

208

See McIntyre, 394 S.E.2d at 898.

209

Id. at 900.
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VI. EQUITABLE CAUSES OF ACTION GIVE RISE TO EQUITABLE DEFENSES

By their very nature, equitable defenses are fact-specific. The precedential
value of cases rests upon the general discussion of the elements of the defense with
the "guidance" provided by the application of those principles to specific facts.210

The first case in West Virginia to address restrictive covenants

recognized that those who seek equitable relief are subject to equitable defenses.21
In Robinson v. Edgell,the court rejected the defendant's argument that subsequent
to the restriction there had been a sufficient change to make enforcement
inequitable.2 12 In rejecting the argument, the court noted that
[n]othing has occurred since the conveyance which has wrought a
change in conditions. The lot was taken subject to known existing
conditions, and a stipulation in the deed prohibiting a particular use
of it. To permit the grantee to prevent the operation of the
restrictive clause by setting up prior or contemporaneous
conditions would enable him to take advantage of his own acts,

rather than those of the grantor. 213

210

See Robinson v. Edgell, 49 S.E. 1027 (W. Va. 1905).

The right to invoke relief by injunction in such cases is not absolute,
however. To a certain extent, the jurisdiction is discretionary. It is governed by
the same general principles which control the jurisdiction to compel specific
performance of contracts. Where a proper case for its exercise is shown, relief is
granted as a matter of course, but if, under the conditions and circumstances
obtaining, the granting of the relief sought would work injustice or be ineffectual
or any meritorious result, it will be refused. If, therefore, the restrictive covenants
in deeds, conveying lots, were made with reference to the continuance of existing
general conditions of the property and surroundings, but in the lapse of time there
has been a change in the character and surroundings, so as to defeat the purposes
of the covenants and to render their enforcement an inequitable, unjust and useless
burden upon the owner of the lot,equity will refuse its aid and leave the plaintiff
to his remedy at law. When such change in conditions is due to the act of the
grantor or is assented to by him, equity will not interfere at his instance.
Id at 1028-29.
211

212

Id. at 1030.

213

Id at 1029.
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One of the better discussions of the equitable defenses is found in Ballard
v. Kitchen.2 14 In the Ballardcase, the court discussed the defendant's argument of
laches or acquiescence (failure to complain when the defendant had conducted a
business on the lot for a number of years);215 the lack of "clean hands" (plaintiffs
violation of the restrictive covenants pertaining to the setback line and the nature
of the building material used);2 6 and equitable estoppel.217 The court, in Ballard,
agreed that the plaintiff's action was barred by laches and acquiescences.1 s
Just as Wallace v. St. Clair219 represents the source of much of the current
understanding of restrictive covenants, it also contains one of the better discussions
of the defenses to their enforcement. As to waiver, the Wallace court noted that
"[t]he willingness of some lot owners in a subdivision to waive a building
restriction is not binding on others who insist on its strict observance *** *,220
Related to waiver is acquiescence, and as to it the court said, "[m]ere acquiescence
does not constitute abandonment so long as the restrictive covenant remains of any
value.""'
One of the common arguments against enforcement of restrictive covenants
arises when there has been a change in the neighborhood. The Wallace court
explained that changed conditions of the neighborhood will not be sufficient to

36 S.E.2d 390 (W. Va. 1945). Another case that discusses equitable defenses that is worth
noting is Kaminsky v. Barr, 145 S.E. 267 (W. Va. 1928). In Kaminsky, the defendant argued a change
of the neighborhood (small stores in residences and the building of a church); acquiescences (plaintiff
did not complain about other violations of restrictions); and laches (failure to take action to compel
removal of"temporary structures" on the lot in question). Id. at 268-69. While rejecting the defense
arguments, the court did modify the injunction to permit the defendant to occupy the set back restricted
area with a front porch to the same extent as the plaintiff. Id. at 269.
214

215

Ballard, 36 S.E.2d at 394.

216

Id. at 394.

217

Id. at 395.

218

Id. at 394.

219

127 S.E.2d 742 (W.Va. 1962).

Id. at 756 (quoting 26 C.LS. Deeds §169 (1956)) (omission in original). See also Miller v.
Bolyard, 411 S.E.2d 684 (W. Va. 1991).
220

221

Wallace, 127 S.E.2d at 756.
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defeat the right unless the changes are "so radical as practically to destroy the
essential objects and purposes of the agreement."'
Finally, the Wallace court held that the trial court erred in finding estoppel,
noting, "[m]ere silence will not work a[s] estoppel; to be effective it must appear
that the person to be estopped has full knowledge of all the facts and of his rights,
and intended to mislead or at least was willing that another party might be misled
by his attitude."
While Wallace provided an overview of several equitable defenses, one of
the more extensive discussions of the change in the neighborhood and acquiescence
is found in Morris v. Nease.'2 4 After noting that West Virginia recognizes that
changes in a neighborhood's character can nullify restrictive covenants affecting
neighborhood property,' the court explained,
Technically, there is a distinction between changes which occur
within the restricted neighborhood itself and changes in the
surrounding, unrestricted area. The "problem of change of
conditions arises where the complainant's and defendant's lots lie
within a restricted subdivision, but the area surrounding the
restricted subdivision has been so changed by the acts of third
persons that the building scheme for the subdivision has been
frustrated through no fault of the lot owners themselves." 2
American Law of Property 445-446 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952,
emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as 2 American Law of
Property]. When, however, the change in the neighborhood's
character is a result of "violations within the subdivision itself, a
problem of abandonment rather than change of conditions is
involved." 2 American Law of Property 446.226

222

Id. at 757.

2Z

Id.

224

238 S.E.2d 844 (W. Va. 1977).

M2s

Id. at 846.

226

Id.
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Noting that changes in neighborhoods often occur through succeeding
block-by-block changes 7 the court explained,
To guard against such an eventuality courts in a majority of
jurisdictions have evolved the rule that "if the benefits of the
original plan for a restricted subdivision can still be realized for the
protection of interior lots, the restrictions should be enforced
against the border lots, notwithstanding the fact that such lot
owners are deprived of the most valuable use of their lots ......
West Virginia has adopted the essence of this salutary rule by
holding that "changed conditions of the neighborhood will not be
sufficient to defeat the right (to enforce restrictive covenants)
unless the changes are 'so radical as practically to destroy the
essential objects and purposes of the agreement."' 22
While rejecting the change of neighborhood defense, the court did agree
there was acquiescence by the plaintiff and the court referred to it as a personal
equitable defense and defined it as follows:
The equitable defense of acquiescence arises where the
complainant has acquiesced in the violation of the same type of
restriction by third parties. Where the complainant has failed to
enforce a similar equitable servitude against third parties, he has
debarred himself from obtaining equitable relief against the
defendant for subsequent violations of the same character. The
reason for allowing this defense of acquiescence is the belief that
the complainant, by his conduct in failing to seek enforcement
against similar violations by third parties, has induced the
defendant to assume that the restrictions are no longer in effect.
Thus, acquiescence by the complainant to the violations of
dissimilar restrictions cannot be a bar to enforcement where the
restrictions are essentially different so that abandonment of one
would not induce a reasonable person to assume that the other was
227

Id at 847. In its explanation of gradual change, the court stated that, "[a]s soon as the border

lots are freed, the next tier of lots is put in the same position as that in which the border lots were
originally. Thus by a step-by-step process the restrictions must be relaxed until the plan is totally
defeated." Id. (citing 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 11, at 446).
228

Morris, 238 S.E.2d at 847. Helpful discussions of the change of neighborhood defense

which applies the law in Morris v. Neese to different facts are Allemong v. Frendzel, 363 S.E.2d 487
(W. Va. 1987), and Miller v. Bolyard, 411 S.E.2d 684 (W. Va. 1991).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1997

49

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 100, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 8
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100:55

also abandoned. Likewise, failure to sue for prior breaches by
others where the breaches were non-injurious to the complainant
cannot be treated as an acquiescence sufficient to bar equitable
relief against a more serious and damaging violation.2 29
VII. CONCLUSION
The lesson of the cases in West Virginia, and in particular Teays Farms v.
Cottrill ° and G. Corp. Inc. v. MackJo, Inc.,23 is that a clear expression of the
parties' original intention in placing restitution in property is crucial. Extra care
should be given that the parties' intentions are clearly manifested in the document
creating the restriction. The lesson of Jubb v. Letterle23 2 and Armstrong v.
Stribling23 is that recorded plats do not necessarily determine the scope of land that
is subject to the restrictions. Unrecorded plats may be relied upon by the court to
determine the parties' original intention.
While the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has essentially ignored
discussing the common law elements, by the very nature of "covenant cases," the
common law requirement of privities is usually met. For this reason, the court's
ignoring this element appears to make little difference. The exception is Allemong
23 4 in which
v. Frendzel,
the court held that an adjoining landowner had standing to
enforce the covenant. 23 5 The holding in Allemong is not consistent with the
common law rules nor supported by earlier West Virginia cases. The statement in
Allemong that the adjoining landowner had standing was made without adequate
explanation.23 6 Therefore, it is submitted that the issue of the right of adjoining
229

Morris, 238 S.E.2d at 848 (citing 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 11, at 441-

442) (footnotes omitted).
230

425 S.E.2d 231 (W. Va. 1992).

231

466 S.E.2d 820 (W. Va. 1995).

232

406 S.E.2d 465 (W. Va. 1991).

233

452 S.E.2d 83 (W. Va. 1994).

234

363 S.E.2d 487 (W. Va. 1987).

235

Id. at 49 1.

The court's explanation is that "Vincent and Mary Howard have standing to seek
enforcement of the covenant as well because as adjacent landowners to the restricted parcel, their land
was intended to reap the benefit of the restrictive covenant." Id.
236
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landowners, without a common grantor or any form of privity or agreement giving
a right to enforce such covenants, should be revisited by the court for further
clarification. 7
West Virginia is not alone in "simplifying" the common law rules of
covenants and equitable servitudes. While the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals has focused on the element of "intent," the courts in some other
jurisdictions have developed their bodies of law around "touch and concern.""
One other case in which the court addressed standing was Recco v. Railway Co., 32 S.E.2d
449 (W. Va. 1944). The court's discussion in that case appears consistent with the common law rule:
Where an owner of land divides it into lots and sells the lots to different grantees
by deeds containing the same negative or affirmative covenants, and the lots are
sold to subsequent grantees, each will be charged with constructive notice of the
covenants in the original deed under which he claims title. Though there would
be no legal privity among the subsequent grantees and therefore one lot owner
cannot maintain an action at law against the owner of any other lot, based upon
the latter's violation of any of the covenants, a suit in equity may be brought by
an original grantee or subsequent grantee against the owner of any other lot to
compel compliance with the covenants contained in the original deeds on the
theory that they created an equitable easement or servitude. But where changed
conditions will render the enforcement of the covenants inequitable or unjustly
burdensome, relief in equity will not be granted. Symons, Pomeroy's Equity
Jurisprudence, 5th ed., Section 1295. Unlike the instant covenant, privity
between the parties is not prerequisite to the enforcement of such equitable
easement or servitude. A court of equity will enforce such covenants,
notwithstanding there may be no legal right, because of the derelict lot owner's
inequitable conduct in the violation of the covenants. By the same token, relief
will be withheld where it would be inequitable to grant it. The Court simply
balances the equities between the contending parties, which it will not do if a
vested property right, such as is clearly-shown by this record, will be destroyed
thereby.
Id at 453. See generally2 AlvMECAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 11, at 415 (entitled "Land Which
Parties Intend to be Benefitted").
237
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The main issue in Spencer's Case was whether a covenantor's successors could
be bound by the covenant unless the covenanting parties agreed that the covenant
should bind "assigns," using that precise word. Holding that the word "assigns"
had to be used if the covenant related to a thing not in esse, the court said in
dictum that the word did not have to be used if the covenant concerned a thing
already existing. All this learning has largely been lost in the American cases. No
American decision has been found that makes anything of the distinction between
things that are or are not in esse. Also, there seems to be extant requirement that
the express word "assigns" ever be used. Instead, American courts look for the
covenanting parties' "intent' that the covenant shall run.
Intent is to be found from all the circumstances surrounding the
covenant. Obviously the use of the word "assigns" is highly persuasive of an"
intent to bind successors. The thorough draftsman will use language to the effect
that "this covenant is intended to be a running covenant, burdening and benefitting
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While the focus on "intent," by its very nature involves a case by case approach, a
body of law has evolved that can provide guidance to those who draft such
restrictions or are asked to construe them.

the parties' successors and assigns." Few recent decisions contain much
discussion of the intent element; rather, the courts seem to conclude that it is or
is not present from the nature of the covenant. A covenant that is found to be of
a "personal" kind, such as one owner's promise to pay his neighbor for something
the neighbor has already done, will be said not to be intended to run. Conversely,
when the covenanted performance is not merely personal but is connected with
land, then the courts seem to assume that the parties intended it to run. This
comes very close to saying that a covenant that touches and concerns will
impliedly be intended to run. Perhaps no authority has put it quite so bluntly, but
that is very nearly what has happened. The logical conclusion of that process is
to make intent disappear as a discrete element, though it is probably premature to
suppose that this has in fact occurred.
CUNNINGHAM, STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY §

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol100/iss1/8

8.16 (2d ed. 1993).
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